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United States Code Isn't Law in the Several States

SUBJECT: Is the United States Code law of the United States? (Rev. 1 -- Nov. 18, 1998)

AUTHOR: Dan Meador; 1108 N. 2nd, Ponca City, Oklahoma 74601 (E-mail: dmeador@poncacity.net)

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This revision is responsive to questions and exceptions to the original sent via e-mail on Monday, Nov. 9, 1998. Most change is in the form of addition to clarify key points or further demonstrates why no section in the United States Code is law of the United States as such. Where the original assumed readers also received the 11/5 transmission and either had or would read my longer work, "Institutionalized Tyranny: The Character & Color of Authority", key elements from the other work are incorporated in this revision, the object being to construct a stand-alone paper. Thanks to Ralph Winterrowd of Anchorage, Alaska sending originals or copies of the Revised Statutes of 1878, the Criminal Code of 1909, the Judicial Code of 1911, the "Code of Laws of the United States of America" of 1934, and the complete United States Code, 1940 ed., it has been possible to prove conclusively that what we know as the United States Code, which is mere evidence of law to begin with, is not applicable in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. As per previous authorization and request, this discourse may be forwarded or posted by others, but second-party comments should be separate from original text except where questions, criticism and corrections are directed to me. Constructive criticism and correction are encouraged as the subject is of considerable import. Dan Meador.

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My e-mail composition pertaining to the United States of America Code, 1934 ed.. (11/5) brought a welcome contributor out of the woodwork -- attorney & patriot Lowell H. "Larry" Becraft, Jr.. As many others, I have followed Larry's work for several years, and have nothing less than admiration and respect for his devotion to ending institutionalized tyranny. He contributes significantly to the body of research that makes its way through the constitutionalist community, and from what I've seen of his work, shares my concern for those who foolishly tempt fate, many times putting themselves and others in harm's way.

Whether or not the United States Code is "law", as such, is a longtime issue for constitutionalists. So much so, that Larry composed an excellent history of the United States Code -- it may be accessed on his web site at http://home.HiWAAY.net/~becraft/titles.html . His composition is well worth reading as it tracks efforts to organize and make sense of laws of the United States. Larry was diligent in his effort, providing the best, most complete historical resource instrument I've seen.

It is against the backdrop of his composition, The Titles of the United States Code, that I wish to once again engage the subject. I suggest that anyone who reads this composition read Larry's, considering the evidence of both, and understand that Larry and I are not adversaries -- we respectively make good faith efforts to unearth and disclose the truth. If Larry chooses to rebut my effort, he will be as diligent as I am.

Larry concludes his paper by citing a court decision in which Title 26 of the United States Code, known as the Internal Revenue Code, was ruled to be law -- United States v. Zuger, 602 F.Supp. 889 (D.Conn. 1984), affirmed on appeal in an unpublished opinion at 755 F. 2d 914 (2nd. Cir. 1985). Since Title 26 is not among the titles enacted as positive law, and is therefore merely prima facie the law, we will assume that the same court would rule that titles enacted as "positive law" (Titles 4, 18, 28, and sundry others) would also be ruled to be law.

One observation I would immediately make pertains to styling of the case: If Larry were to secure the original indictment or complaint, I suspect it is styled, United States of America v. Zuger. In other words, the published cite, if the cite is complete, is very probably a misrepresentation as virtually all Federal civil and criminal prosecution since some time prior to 1948 has proceeded in the name and by authority of the "United States of America", which I've demonstrated to be a government foreign to the United States and the several States party to the Constitution -- this relatively new creation, which is not to be confused with the original United States of America established in Article I of the Articles of Confederation (1777), does not have constitutional or statutory standing in the several States party to the Constitution. The case styling misrepresentation is simply part of the Cooperative Federalism fraud -- persistent and consistent document fraud. The Constitution vests all authority in a governmental entity designated and known as the United States, none in an entity designated and known as the United States of America.

The Zuger decision, written by a Connecticut district judge, and confirmed by an unpublished Second Circuit opinion, contradicts Murrell v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1947) 160 F. 2d 787, 788; United States v. Mercur Corporation (1936), 83 F. 2d 178, 180; and Royer's Inc. v. United States (1959), 265 F. 2d 615, 618. The Royer's case was decided more than a decade after Titles 18 & 28 of the United States Code were enacted as "positive law". Internal evidence of the United States Code and enacting legislation reinforce the three decisions cited here, contrary to the Zuger decision -- the United States Code, according to these decisions, is not law as such, but is merely evidence of law.

To secure a point of demarcation, we will consider three questions that provide a constitutional context for our inquiry:

1. Have provisions relating to gold and silver coin of the United States in Article I, Sections 8 & 10 of the Constitution been amended or repealed?

2. Does any amendment to the Constitution place narcotics and other currently controlled substances under Congress' regulatory authority?

3. Does any delegated authority in or amendment to the Constitution authorize Congress (a) to establish a national bank, or (b) control the national economy by regulating interest rates?

Larry has probably read the Constitution at least as many times as I have, and his understanding of it is probably better than mine, but I think he would agree that the answer to the three questions above is "No." Those who haven't read the Constitution should do so -- don't take my word, or Larry's, for anything. If you don't go to the source, you have no cause to whine and moan if someone inadvertently misleads you.

The three questions above must be considered in the context of Tenth Article of Amendment "Thou shall not!" language:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

I've employed the following story metaphorically in other articles, but I'm going to take the liberty of repeating it: It seems that a lady unexpectedly returned home, and when she arrived, found her husband intimately involved with another woman. The husband had sufficient presence of mind not to panic. He might have been in the Clinton lineage. He calmly separated himself from the paramour, dressed, then asked his wife, "Are you going to believe me or your lying eyes?"

To argue that the Constitution doesn't mean what it says, or authorizes exercise of power other than that which is specifically enumerated, has the same merit as the philandering husband insisting that his wife didn't see what she saw. This kind of elitist attitude defies common sense and should insult everyone who reads the Constitution. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that Federal authorities have engaged in gross usurpation of power. The more relevant concerns are how, why, and when. These questions frame the broad context of this inquiry. What is commonly known as the United States Code provides a focus for the inquiry.

The United States commenced printing paper money subsequent to the Julliard decision in 1884. However, through the early part of the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court upheld States of the Union when they insisted on payment of taxes by their respective Citizens in gold and silver coin. This would seem inconsistent, but it isn't: Read Naval Academy founder George Bancroft's excellent criticism of the Julliard decision, which was a complete reversal of the 1880 Knox decision, to find that Julliard was predicated on Congress' plenary power under the Article IV, Sec. 3 territorial clause. In territory of the United States, Congress has the combined power of State and National government, and is construed to be able to exercise any power not explicitly or implicitly prohibited by the Constitution. Congress might print paper money for use in territory of the United States, but the several States respectively could not legislatively authenticate it by statutorily making it legal tender for payment of debt. A few State governments resisted the early fraud by refusing to accept United States paper money for payment of taxes.

In 1836, President Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill that would have renewed the charter of the second national bank, justifying the veto by the fact that the Constitution does not delegate authority for the United States to establish national banks. President Jackson's position has never been successfully challenged, and the Constitution has never been amended to authorize Congress to establish a national bank.

In United States v. Constantine (Dec. 1935) 296 U.S. 233, the Supreme Court ended Federal enforcement of State law relating to liquor, ruling that when the Eighteenth Article of Amendment was repealed by the Twenty-first in December 1933, concurrent State and Federal jurisdiction for enforcement of State law relating to alcohol was lost. In effect, unless or until the Constitution enumerates power for United States Government to regulate any given commodity, other than possibly taxing production and distribution, no such authority exists. The decision put skids on the Federal Alcohol Administration, which Congress created in summer 1935, with the eventual consequence of President Franklin D. Roosevelt placing administration of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act under Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico jurisdiction via reorganization plan in 1940 (BIR, Puerto Rico name changed to Internal Revenue Service via T.D.O. No. 150-29 (1953); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms spun off from IRS in 1972 via Treasury Order.).

Does the Constitution delegate authority for Congress to establish and control interest rates or regulate banking? I haven't seen either subject mentioned, but others are welcome to correct my oversight if they know of such constitutionally delegated powers.

Now we will ask the same questions of the Code:

Does the United States Code evidence statutory authority for establishing the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Banks? Does it itemize authority of the Fed? Does the Fed regulate two key interest rates, and establish capital reserve requirements for member banks? Do Federal Reserve Banks issue an otherwise unsecured private scrip, predicated on obligations of the United States, known as the Federal Reserve Note?

Keep in mind that the Federal Reserve Note is "legal tender for all debts, public and private," in "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA".

Does the United States Code include a raft of laws pertaining to production, distribution, purchase and use of opium, cocaine, and other commodities presently classified as controlled dangerous substances?

These questions must be answered in the affirmative. In fact, if you were to read all fifty titles of the Code from cover-to-cover, you would find that some provision in the Code regulates nearly every aspect of life, the object obviously being to impose Federal authority over subject classes from cradle to grave. The Code clearly exceeds enumerated powers delegated to the United States by the Constitution. Therefore, we must conclude that at least some portions of the Code don't apply to the several States and the American people at large. Either that or the Constitution has been pitched out the window. We cannot escape one or the other conclusion.

With the constitutional context in place, let's turn to elements of the Code itself. The first stop will be section 7806 of Title 26, which specifies construction of the title designated as the Internal Revenue Code:

Sec. 7806. Construction of title.

(a) Cross references.

The cross references in this title to other portions of the title, or other provisions of law, where the word "see" is used, are made only for convenience, and shall be given no legal effect.

(b) Arrangement and classification.

No inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or provision or portion of this title, nor shall any table of contents, table of cross references, or similar outline, analysis, or descriptive matter relating to the contents of this title be given any legal effect. The preceding sentence also applies to the sidenotes and ancillary tables contained in the various prints of this Act before its enactment into law.

The central point for purposes here is that no implication of legislative construction can be derived from placement of anything in the title. Maybe sections in Title 26 exactly duplicate original legislation published in the Statutes at Large, or maybe they don't. Regardless, they are respectively absent any implication of legislative construction -- something more must be added to determine application, obligation, authority, etc. Therefore, sections of Title 26, in and of themselves, do not vest a franchise of authority, or impose an obligation or penalty on anyone. Legislative construction of any given section must be determined by some authority in addition to, and in many cases, beyond Title 26.

The disclaimer above clearly demonstrates limits of titles not enacted as positive law. We will demonstrate why no section in and of itself can be given legislative construction, but first will consider the next obvious question: "What about titles enacted as positive law?"

Titles 18 & 28, the criminal and judiciary codes, are among those Larry lists in his article on the United States Code, both enacted as "positive law" in 1948. Titles enacted as positive law are listed in the Preface of the current edition of the Code. Title 18, the criminal code, was enacted as positive law by the act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, Sec. 1, 62 Stat. 683, which has been amended several times since. However, Section 19 of the original act, which provides a disclaimer similar to that found in Title 26, remains in full force and effect:

Sec. 19. No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, as set out in section 1 of the Act, in which any particular section is placed, nor by reason of the catchlines used in such title.

Title 28, on the judiciary, was enacted by the act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, Sec. 1, 62 Stat. 869, with the general disclaimer pertaining to legislative construction being Section 33, 62 Stat. 991:

No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, as set out in section 1 of this Act, in which any section is placed, nor by reason of the catchlines used in such title.

Essentially the same disclaimer appears in enacting legislation for titles which are classified as prima facie the law, and those enacted as positive law, the latter constituting "legal evidence" of the law. By consulting Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition, it is found that "legal evidence" can be documentary or testimonial:

Legal evidence. A broad general term meaning all admissible evidence, including both oral and documentary, but with a further implication that it must be of such a character as tends reasonably and substantially to prove the point, not to raise a mere suspicion or conjecture...

Any given section of the Code isn't particularly unique so far as being evidential. It is evidence of law of the United States, but since no section can be given legislative construction, no section in and of itself has any particular weight as conclusive authority. Application must be proven from some other source.

In order to test this notion, we will consult two basic internal authorities found in Title 1 of the United States Code. The first is section 113:

Sec. 113. "Little and Brown's" edition of laws and treaties; slip laws; Treaties and Other International Acts Series; admissibility in evidence

The edition of the laws and treaties of the United States, published by Little and Brown, and the publications in slip or pamphlet form of the laws of the United States issued under the authority of the Archivist of the United States, and the Treaties and Other International Acts Series issued under the authority of the Secretary of State shall be competent evidence of the several public and private Acts of Congress, and of the treaties, international agreements other than treaties, and proclamations by the President of such treaties and international agreements other than treaties, as the case may be, therein contained, in all the courts of law and equity and of maritime jurisdiction, and in all the tribunals and public offices of the United States, and of the several States, without any further proof or authentication thereof.

Let's see if the United States Code meets the same test in Section 204 of Title 1:

Sec. 204. Codes and Supplements as evidence of the laws of United States and District of Columbia; citation of Codes and Supplements

In all courts, tribunals, and public offices of the United States, at home or abroad, of the District of Columbia, and of each State, Territory, or insular possession of the United States --

(a) United States Code. - The matter set forth in the edition of the Code of Laws of the United States current at any time shall, together with the then current supplement, if any, establish prima facie the laws of the United States, general and permanent in their nature, in force on the day preceding the commencement of the session following the last session the legislation of which is included: Provided, however, That whenever titles of such Code shall have been enacted into positive law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws therein contained, in all the courts of the United States, the several States, and the Territories and insular possessions of the United States.

There has been an amount of amendment to these sections since originals preserved in the 1934 edition of the Code. Sec. 204(a) above, from the current edition, specifies that titles of the Code enacted as positive law are "legal evidence" of laws of the United States in courts of the United States, the several States, and territories and insular possessions of the United States. Therefore, sections of titles enacted as positive law constitute documentary evidence that cannot be given legislative construction in all courts in the nation. That is not the case for those titles not enacted as positive law, including title 26, the Internal Revenue Code. Titles not enacted as positive law are prima facie the law only in courts of the United States, and States, Territories and insular possessions of the United States. States of the United States are not States of the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Conversely, the Little and Brown publications named in Section 113 are "competent evidence of the several public and private Acts of Congress ... In all the courts of law and equity and of maritime jurisdiction, and in all the tribunals and public offices of the United States, and of the several States, without any further proof or authentication thereof."

By again consulting Black's Law Dictionary, it is easy to see the distinction between "legal evidence" and "competent evidence":

Competent evidence. That which the very nature of the thing to be proven requires, as, the production of a writing where its contents are the subject of inquiry...

The substance and quality of evidence of the Little and Brown publication or publications is significantly different than the Code, and in general, application is different. In no instance has Congress given weight to titles of the Code as "competent evidence."

This same terminology was employed in the 1934 edition of the Code, except none of the titles had been enacted as positive law, so each title retained the original character of being prima facie the law. In the 1934 edition, the current Sec. 113 of Title 1 was in two sections, crediting slips, etc., published by the Secretary of State in Sec. 30, and the Little and Brown publication in Sec. 30a. We'll examine only Sec. 30a from the 1934 edition:

§ 30a. "Little and Brown's" edition of laws and treaties competent evidence of Acts of Congress. The edition of the laws and treaties of the United States, published by Little & Brown, shall be competent evidence of the several public and private acts of Congress, and of the several treaties therein contained, in all the courts of law and equity and of maritime jurisdiction, and in all the tribunals and public offices of the United States, and of the several States, without any further proof of authentication thereof. (R.S. § 908.)

Note that 1 U.S.C. § 30a, 1934 ed., is based on § 908 of the Revised Statutes of 1878. The Little and Brown publication of what amount to congressional session laws has been designated as stand-alone "competent evidence" of laws of the United States since before the Code was a glimmer of an idea. Authenticity of the Little and Brown publication remains as it has been since the last century. By contrast, the nature of the Code is reflected in § 54 of Title 1, 1934 ed.:

§ 54. Codes and Supplements as establishing prima facie the Laws of United States and District of Columbia; citation of Codes and Supplements. In all courts, tribunals and public offices of the United States, at home or abroad, of the District of Columbia, and of each State, Territory, or Insular possession of the United States --

(a) Code of Laws of United States; effect as prima facie the law. The matter set forth in the edition of the Code of Laws of the United States current at any time shall, together with the then current supplement, if any, establish prima facie the laws of the United States, general and permanent in their nature, in force on the day preceding the commencement of the session following the last session the legislation of which is included.

A fundamental principle for interpretation of law is simply that Congress says what Congress means in legislation. Where specific terminology is employed, effect of legislation is limited to what the terms mean. Where two distinct terms are used, each has unique meaning. Distinction between two words or phrases is expressed by the obvious conclusion that A is not B (A ~ B). More particularly, "... the several States" ~ "States of the United States", and "legal evidence" ~ "competent evidence".

I admit that I haven't read the Zuger decision cited in the Becraft memorandum on the United States Code, but it's obvious in the context of United States Code authorities cited above that even titles of the Code enacted as positive law in the 1940's and since are not competent or conclusive evidence of laws of the United States. Congress has stipulated that titles enacted as positive law constitute "legal evidence" (documentary evidence) of laws of the United States in courts of the United States and the several States, but those titles not enacted as positive law, such as Title 26, designated as the Internal Revenue Code, are merely prima facie the law in courts of the United States, and in States, Territories and insular possessions subject to sovereignty of the United States under the territorial clause. The latter is exclusive of courts of the several States party to the Constitution.

Is it possible that Congress could specify that the Code is more significant with respect to its authoritative significance? Of course it is, but three factors must be considered: (1) Congress hasn't seen fit to legislatively give the Code the same weight of conclusive authenticity as Little & Brown publications; (2) the Code is simply a classification system which is not the vehicle for legislation; and (3) the Code, as most people are exposed to it, constitutes a subtle fraud.

In his treatise, Larry confirms that the Act of June 30, 1926, H.R. 10000, was in fact the Act in which Congress authorized the "United States Code", and that this act is still in effect. I was happy to find his confirmation as I don't have immediate access to the Statutes at Large, so would have to have done considerable tracking to confirm continuing authority of the Act. With Larry's confirmation, I will trust that the Act cited above determines what the Code is:

AN ACT TO consolidate, codify, and set forth the general and permanent laws of the United States in force December seventh, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the fifty titles hereinafter set forth are intended to embrace the laws of the United States, general and permanent in their nature, in force on the 7th day of December, 1925, compiled into a single volume under the authority of Congress, and designated "The Code of the Laws of the United States of America."

Sec. 2. In all courts, tribunals, and public offices of the United States, at home or abroad, of the District of Columbia, and of each State, Territory, or insular possession of the United States --

(a) The matter set forth in the Code, evidenced as hereinafter in this section provided, shall establish prima facie the laws of the United States, general and permanent in their nature, in force on the 7th day of December, 1925; but nothing in this Act shall be construed as repealing or amending any such law, or as enacting as new law any matter contained in the Code. In case of any inconsistency arising through omission or otherwise between the provisions of any section of this Code and the corresponding portion of legislation heretofore enacted effect shall be given for all purposes whatsoever to such enactments.

(b) Copies of this Act printed at the Government Printing Office and bearing its imprint shall be conclusive evidence of the original of the Code in the custody of the Secretary of State.

If Larry is correct, as I trust he is, what we know and cite as the United States Code is really The Code of the Laws of the United States of America. That's what the law says, at least, and I certainly don't want to impute error to Congress. Since the Constitution delegates authority to the United States, not the United States of America, and the Code is designated The Code of the Laws of the United States of America in enacting legislation, it must be municipal in nature, just as the District of Columbia Code is (Sec. 204(c) of Title 1 U.S.C.). Which is to say, regardless of whether any given section of the Code is merely prima facie the law or documentary evidence of law, and whether or not any given section can be given legislative construction, application is limited to territory subject to sovereignty of the United States under Article IV, Sec. 3, clause 2 of the Constitution.

Since we're introducing terminology many may not be familiar with, we will cite definitions of "municipal" and "municipal law" from Black's Law Dictionary:

Municipal. In narrower, more common sense, it means pertaining to a local governmental unit, commonly, a city or town or other governmental unit. In its broader sense, it means pertaining to the public or governmental affairs of a state or nation or of a people ... Relating to a state or nation, particularly when considered as an entity independent of other states or nations.

Municipal law. That which pertains solely to the citizens and inhabitants of a state, and is thus distinguished from political law, commercial law, and international law ... In its more common and narrower connotation however it means those laws which pertain to towns, cities and villages and their local government.

Congress has municipal authority over territory belonging to the United States. For example, the local government of Washington, D.C. exists in whatever form Congress determines by legislation, and may legislate local law only within the context of what Congress determines. The District of Columbia was first incorporated as a municipal corporation in 1802, and provisions of the charter have probably been changed by congressional edict a dozen or more times since, particularly in the 1870's. Congress has no such authority in the several States party to the Constitution. Powers of the United States may be extended to the several States only within the framework of those powers enumerated in the Constitution.

This is where our three constitutional questions bring things into focus: The Code of the Laws of the United States of America clearly evidences law that goes beyond constitutionally enumerated powers of the United States. Since the United States can exercise only power delegated by the Constitution in the several States party to the Constitution, The Code of the Laws of the United States of America, as a whole, cannot be applicable in the several States party to the Constitution. Yet the Code does not clearly distinguish between laws applicable solely in territory of the United States and those that might be applicable in the Union of several States. The formal title of the Code, The Code of the Laws of the United States of America, and the fact that the Code was originally designated as prima facie law of the United States save in courts of the United States and territory subject to sovereignty of the United States, is suggestive that the entire Code is municipal in nature -- that it has never had geographical application save in territory belonging to the United States.

This might seem to be a leap in logic except we have Sec. 80 of Title 18, 1934 ed, of The Code of the Laws of the United States of America, to demonstrate that the United States and the United States of America are distinct, separate entities:

§ 80. (Criminal Code, section 35, amended.) Presenting false claims. Whoever shall make or cause to be made or present or cause to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or any department thereof, or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent; or whoever shall by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or statements or representations, or make or use or cause to be made or used any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or of any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. (R.S. § 5438; May 30, 1908, c. 235, 35 Stat. 555; Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095; Oct. 23, 1918, c. 194, 40 Stat. 1015; June 18, 1934, c. 587, 48 Stat. 996.)

The section above demonstrates our principle again: A ~ B. Where the United States and the United States of America are specifically mentioned in the same section, one is distinguished from the other: the United States ~ the United States of America. Possibly the best place to see this distinction clearly set out is in Attorney General delegations of authority to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons at 28 CFR, Parts 0.96 & 0.96b:

§ 0.96 Delegations

The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is authorized to exercise or perform any of the authority, functions, or duties conferred or imposed upon the Attorney General by any law relating to the commitment, control, or treatment of persons (including insane prisoners and juvenile delinquents) charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States...

§ 0.96b Exchange of prisoners.

The Director of the Bureau of Prisons and officers of the Bureau of Prisons designated by him are authorized to receive custody of offenders and to transfer offenders to and from the United States of America under a treaty as referred to in Public Law 95-144; to make arrangements with the States and to receive offenders from the States for transfer to a foreign country; to act as an agent of the United States to receive the delivery from a foreign government of any person being transferred to the United States under such a treaty; to render to foreign countries and to receive from them certifications and reports required under a treaty; and to receive custody and carry out the sentence of imprisonment of such a transferred offender as required by that statute and any such treaty.

The Director, under authority of the delegation order at 28 CFR § 0.96, is authorized to take charge of those accused or convicted of offenses against the United States; under delegated authority at 28 CFR § 0.96b, the Director acts as agent of the United States and is "authorized to receive custody of offenders and to transfer offenders to and from the United States of America..."

The above demonstrates that (1) the United States ~ the United States of America, and (2) the United States of America is a geographical jurisdiction distinct and separate from United States jurisdiction.

To conclusively demonstrate distinction between the United States and the United States of America, we will consider historical and statutory notes following Section 1001 in the current edition of Title 18:

Words "or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder" in said § 80 [1940 ed. U.S.C.] were omitted as unnecessary in view of definition of "agency" in § 6 of this title. [my insert for clarification]

For verification purposes, we will include 18 U.S.C. § 6, 1994 ed.:

§ 6. Department and agency defined

As used in this title:

The term "department" means one of the executive departments enumerated in section 1 of Title 5, unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government.

The term "agency" includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense. (June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 685)

We've already established that the "United States of America" is a governmental entity foreign to the United States, and that the geographical jurisdiction is distinct from the several States party to the Constitution. Current 18 U.S.C. § 1001 notes & § 6 conclusively demonstrate that this United States of America entity is an agency of the United States -- it is a creation, instrumentality, and/or political subdivision of the United States subject to sovereignty of the United States. If it is a municipal corporation, as I suspect it is, the United States owns a proprietary interest in it.

The fact that this particular United States of America is a reasonably new creation is verified by § 5438 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, as there is no mention of the United States of America in this section:

Sec. 5438. Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or approval of such claim, makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, or who enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to defraud the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any false or fraudulent claim, or who, having charge, possession, custody, or control of any money or other public property used or to be used in the military or naval service, who, with intent to defraud the United States or willfully to conceal such money or other property, delivers or causes to be delivered, to any other person having authority to receive the same, any amount of such money or other property less than that for which he received a certificate or took a receipt, and every person authorized to make or deliver any certificate, voucher, receipt, or other paper certifying the receipt of arms, ammunition, provisions, clothing, or other property so used or to be used, who makes or delivers the same to any other person without a full knowledge of the truth of the facts states therein, and with intent to defraud the United States, and every person who knowingly purchases or receives in pledge for any obligation or indebtedness from any soldier, officer, sailor, or other person called into or employed in the military or naval service any arms, equipments, ammunition, clothes, military stores, or other public property, such soldier, sailor, officer, or other person not having the lawful right to pledge or sell the same, every person so offending in any of the matters set forth in this section shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one nor more than five years, or fined not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars.

The Revised Statutes section above was based on original Civil War legislation, the act of 1 March, 1863, c. 67, ss. 1, 3, v. 12 pp. 696, 698. The 1878 revision was preserved in the act of March 4, 1909, c. 321, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095, so the "United States of America" came on the scene some time after that. By chronologically tracking this statutory evolution, it is clear that the "United States of America" identified in the Code is not the original United States of America established in Article I of the Articles of Confederation; it is a Twentieth Century creation, a political alliance or compact of insular possessions of the United States subject to sovereignty of the United States under the territorial clause at Article IV, Sec. 3, clause 2 of the Constitution.

The conclusion is supported by our three constitutionally-derived questions and both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence relating to the Code. By demonstrating that the Code embodies evidence of municipal law in the United States of America subject to sovereignty of the United States, we can establish the following conclusions: So far as people of the several States party to the Constitution are concerned, the question of whether or not the Code of Laws of the United States of America is or isn't law is irrelevant except in the event that a Citizen of one of the several States owns property or engages in some enterprise in territory belonging to the United States; any given section of the Code is either prima facie (by appearance) the law or documentary evidence of municipal law applicable in insular possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia; and no legislative construction may be given to any section of the Code, so the Code, in an of itself, vests no authority in any officer, department, or court of the United States and creates no obligation or penalty for anyone.

Some will say that the proof of the pudding is in the tasting, so we will subject this conclusion to the acid test. We will do this by examining Section 7621 of Title 26, which vests authority to establish internal revenue districts in the President:

Sec. 7621. Internal revenue districts.

(a) Establishment and alteration.

The President shall establish convenient internal revenue districts for the purpose of administering the internal revenue laws. The president may from time to time alter such districts.

(b) Boundaries.

For the purpose mentioned in subsection (a), the President may subdivide any State or the District of Columbia, or may unite into one district two or more States.

Statutory authorization for the President to delegate authority to carry out duties vested in him to inferior officers is evidenced in Sec. 301 of Title 3 of the Code. This section specifies that the President must delegate authority by Executive Order which is properly published in the Federal Register. By consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, located in the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations, it is found that Sec. 7621 of Title 26 is not listed. Therefore, if authority to establish internal revenue districts has been delegated from the President to an inferior officer, the delegation does not have general application to the several States and the population at large. However, as fortune would have it, there is a note which identifies the Executive Order that delegated this authority to the Secretary at 26 CFR, Part 301.7621-1:

For delegation to the Secretary of authority to prescribe internal revenue districts for the purpose of administering the internal revenue laws, see Executive Order No. 10289, dated September 17, 1951 (16 FR 9499), as made applicable to the Code by Executive Order No. 10574, dated November 5, 1954 (19 FR 7449).

Executive Order No. 10289 is published following Sec. 301 of Title 3. In the Executive Order, which I'm not going to bother reproducing here, authority conveyed to the Secretary of the Treasury relates to customs duties, the Anti-Smuggling Act, which is maritime in nature, and establishing internal revenue districts, as specified in Sec. 7621 of Title 26. Now that we have the Executive Order number, we will again reference the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, and there we find that regulations promulgated under this order are located in Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 101. By referencing the List of CFR Titles, Chapters, Subchapters, and Parts, also in the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations, we find that Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations relates to Customs Duties; Part 101 is in Chapter I, which is under administration of the United States Customs Service; and Part 101 prescribes general provisions for the United States Customs Service. There are legitimately United States Customs Service offices in the several States, but there are no internal revenue districts as such in the several States. Customs Service authority relates only to imports and exports, there is no general jurisdiction of the Customs Service in the several States.

Our evidence continues to support the conclusion that the Code of Laws of the United States of America does not have general application in the several States. If it did, each of the several States would certainly be or be in a lawfully established internal revenue district.

It has long been known that the Secretary of the Treasury did delegate authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in matters pertaining to internal revenue in Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and other insular possessions via T.D.O. No. 150-42 (1956), and in that order, removed customs jurisdiction over these areas from district and regional customs offices in Florida, Georgia and New York. The order was amended by T.D.O. No. 150-01 (1986), by removing the Canal Zone and adding other areas of the world where this authority applies, namely in Guam and American Samoa. The Virgin Islands is included -- see Title 48 of the Code of Laws of the United States of America.

Why is there an Internal Revenue Service district office in nearly every State? Only God and the little green gremlins know. IRS, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, are successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico -- the General Accounting Office, as general agent of the Treasury of the United States, is responsible for determining all claims of and against the United States, including tax claims. Read Larry's excellent memorandum that demonstrates that Congress never created a Bureau of Internal Revenue -- it was very probably created by the provisional government of Puerto Rico, operating under the U.S. Military, in 1900-1904. In 1900, Congress did establish the Puerto Rico Special Fund (Internal Revenue), which in 1934 became Puerto Rico Trust No. 62 (Internal Revenue), so the provisional government probably created the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, to administer internal revenue laws of the United States, as they applied to Puerto Rico, in 1900. Those records have yet to be secured.

Possibly the notion of "legislative construction" isn't clear in the mind of some readers, so we'll treat the matter in some detail: The first thing that is important to get solidly in mind is that Congress is responsible for all legislation that creates departments, agencies, and courts of the United States other than those specifically established by the Constitution, and that Congress must promulgate legislation which carries all constitutionally enumerated powers into force. The Constitution itself is passive so far as powers enumerated in it. Analogously, the Constitution might be viewed as a dry cell battery used to operate a radio, tape recorder or something on that order. To the point there is something hooked to it to draw on its power, the Constitution, like the battery, serves as a repository of power.

The central section which vests Congress with exclusive legislative authority is at Article I, Sec. 8, clause 18:

[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

To the point Congress enacts a law for any given purpose, the other two branches of United States government and Congress can do nothing. To grasp this, imagine that the President, Supreme Court justices, and other government officers have been selected for their respective offices, but Congress hasn't done anything yet. When Congress convenes a legislative session, each law serves as a shell to put some constitutionally enumerated power in -- envision filling a basket with Easter eggs. Once Congress puts power eggs in the law basket and the President signs the law, the basket is delivered to the court or administrative agency for which it is intended. Only then can the judicial or administrative officer exercise a constitutionally enumerated power. Until he has eggs in his basket, he can do nothing.

One of the statutes Congress put in place to protect integrity of the Constitution and Congress' legislative authority is evidenced at Section 72 of Title 4:

Sec. 72. Public offices; at seat of Government

All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.

This gives us a context for considering 26 U.S.C. § 7621, which vests authority in the President for establishing internal revenue districts. The President delegated this authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, then the Secretary of the Treasury redelegated it to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, but only as it relates to insular possessions of the United States. No internal revenue districts have ever been established in the Union of several States. Consequently, there is no statutory or regulatory authority for IRS, BATF, and other such agencies to exercise authority in the several States.

Now let's consider 26 U.S.C. § 7601:

Sec. 7601. Canvass of districts for taxable persons and objects

(a) General rule

The Secretary shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed.

(b) Penalties

For penalties applicable to forcible obstruction or hindrance of Treasury officers or employees in the performance of their duties, see section 7212.

Given that there are no implementing regulations for § 7621, which authorizes establishment of internal revenue districts, it shouldn't be surprising if 7601 didn't have implementing regulations, either. But that isn't the case. By consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, it is found that regulations are listed as Parts 24, 25, 70, 170, 270, 290, 295 & 296 of Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Regulations in 27 CFR § 70 are particularly important as they prescribe administrative procedure for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for administration of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, which I've demonstrated in another published memorandum as being moved under Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico administration via Reorganization Plan No. III of 1940. This evidence is consistent with evidence supporting the thesis of this discourse. Internal revenue districts for Subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code, which includes provisions relating to alcohol, tobacco and firearms, are in insular possessions of the United States; there are no internal revenue districts in the several States. Canvassing authority conveyed in 26 U.S.C. § 7601 is limited to internal revenue districts; this section is dependent on authority for establishing internal revenue districts conveyed in § 7621. Other regulations listed pertain to Subtitle E commodities other than alcohol, and tariffs relating to these items as they are imported.

Additionally, by reading 27 CFR § 70, it is found that regulations pertaining to normal tax imposed on Federal officers and employees of United States political subdivisions are neatly hidden away here.

There is no regulatory authority for canvassing internal revenue districts to determine liability for Subtitle A normal tax, Subtitle C employment tax, etc. If there were, the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules would have a listing under Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations for this section.

It is important to see that 26 U.S.C. § 7601, which conveys statutory authority for the Secretary to authorize canvassing of internal revenue districts, appears prior to § 7621, which authorizes the President to establish internal revenue districts. In order to know what exercise of authority is or isn't legitimate under 7601, we must know what has been done under authority of 7621, and we must know limitations imposed by 4 U.S.C. § 72. Consequently, it is impossible to determine application of 26 U.S.C. 7601 by itself -- the section has no implication of legislative construction. In and of itself, it doesn't vest a franchise of authority in anyone, and it doesn't create an obligation or penalty for anyone.

The whole of Title 26, and Internal Revenue Service claims of authority must also be seen in light of 31 U.S.C. § 3702:

Sec. 3702. Authority of the Comptroller General to settle claims

(a) Except as provided in this chapter or another law, the Comptroller General shall settle all claims of or against the United States Government...

In June 1921, Congress hid the Treasury of the United States by creating the General Accounting Office, then moving Treasury employees to GAO, with GAO under direction of the Comptroller General. GAO is general agent of the Treasury, not to be confused with the Department of Treasury, and it is here that all claims of or against the United States must be determined. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, IRS, and BATF do not have statutory authority to determine legitimacy of claims of the United States or claims against the United States, including tax liabilities. By consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, we find that implementing regulations for 31 U.S.C. § 3702 in general are at 4 CFR §§ 30, 31, 35 & 36, with additional regulations at 5 CFR § 178 and 48 CFR § 6104. It is necessary to go to the Statutes at Large for June 1921 to determine the scope of the act which this section evidences.

When I first demonstrated that United States District Courts situated in the several States are private courts, not lawful courts of the United States, a fellow researcher insisted that United States District Courts in the several States are authenticated by 28 U.S.C. § 132. I was fully aware of the section, but chose to ignore it in the construction of proofs as I had read historical and statutory notes following it, so knew the section is one of the most sinister decoys in the United States Code. It's there to give the appearance of legitimacy, it has no effect whatever. We'll examine it here as it is one of the clear examples of why sections in the United States Code, even in a title that has been enacted as positive law, are not competent or even reliable evidence of laws of the United States. The section follows, reproduced from the West Publishing 1997 desktop edition of the United States Code:

§ 132. Creation and composition of district courts

(a) There shall be in each judicial district a district court which shall be a court of record known as the United States District Court for the district.

(b) Each district court shall consist of the district judge or judges for the district in regular active service. Justices or judges designated or assigned shall be competent to sit as judges of the court.

(c) Except as otherwise provided by law, or rule or order of court, the judicial power of the district court with respect to any action, suit or proceeding may be exercised by a single judge, who may preside alone and hold a regular or special session of court at the same time other sessions are held by other judges. (June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 895; Nov. 13, 1963, Pub. L. 88-176, § 2, 77 Stat. 331.)

The section above appears to be straight forward and legitimate until you realize there are actually two different courts floating around, and identified in various titles of the United States Code. At the first level, there are legitimate Article III courts of the United States, then there are territorial courts. The first is the "district court of the United States", the second is the "United States District Court". If we take 28 U.S.C. § 132 at face value, it appears to legitimize United States District Courts in the several States. But if it does, it contradicts definitions of the two different courts as defined by the Supreme Court:

The term "District Courts of the United States," as used in the rules, without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under article 3 of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are legislative courts, properly speaking, and are not District Courts of the United States. We have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a "District Court of the United States." (Mookini vs. United States (1938) 58 S.Ct. 543, 303 U.S. 201, 82 L.Ed. 748, at p. 205)

The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial powers of the United States therein conveyed. It is created in virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under article 4, § 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of restoring to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court. (Balzac vs. Porto Rico (1922) 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298, 66 L.Ed. 627, at 258 U.S. 312)

Maybe the best place in the United States Code to see the two courts contrasted by putting them in the same proximity is in the Internal Revenue Code, at 26 U.S.C. §§ 7323 & 7402:

§ 7323. Judicial action to enforce forfeiture.

(a) Nature and venue.

The proceedings to enforce such forfeitures shall be in the nature of a proceeding in rem in the United States District Court for the district where such seizure is made.

§ 7402. Jurisdiction of district courts.

(a) To issue orders, processes, and judgments.

The district courts of the United States at the instance of the United States shall have such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil actions, writs and orders of injunction, and of ne exeat republica, orders appointing receivers, and such other orders and processes, and to render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws. The remedies hereby provided are in addition to and not exclusive of any and all other remedies of the United States in such courts or otherwise to enforce such laws.

As seen in Mookini vs. United States and Balzac vs. Porto Rico, a United States District Court is not a district court of the United States. In short, A ~ B. We're dealing with two distinct, separate entities. The Supreme Court has defined the "United States District Court" as a territorial court, and the "District Court of the United States" as the legitimate Article III court of the United States. As a consequence, we have to come to grips with 28 U.S.C. § 132 in order to resolve not only Supreme Court definitions, but the obvious distinction stated in §§ 7323 & 7402 of the current Internal Revenue Code. To do that, we will consult Historical and Statutory Notes following 28 U.S.C. § 132 to find origins:

1948 Acts. Based on Title 28, U.S.C., 1948 ed., section 1, and section 641 of Title 48, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Territories and Insular Possessions...

Fortunately, a friend recently sent me a copy of the entire 1940 edition of the United States Code so we can examine where 28 U.S.C. § 132 of the current edition originates. Relative portions of 28 U.S.C. § 1, 1940 ed., are as follows:

§ 1. (Judicial Code, section 1.) District Courts; judges; appointments and residence.

In each of the districts described in chapter five of this title there shall be a court called a district court, for which there shall be appointed one judge, to be called a district judge...

Every district judge shall reside in the district or one of the districts for which he is appointed, and for offending against this provision shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor.

The above section was based on Sec. 1 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1911, as amended. The following is 48 U.S.C. § 641, 1940 edition:

§ 641. District court; sessions; powers; terms.

There shall be established in the Territory of Hawaii a district court, to consist of two judges, who shall reside therein and be called district judges, and who shall each receive an annual salary of $10,000. The two judges shall from time to time, either by order or rules of the court, prescribe at what times and in what classes of cases each of them shall preside.

The two judges may each hold separately and at the same time a session of the court (whether at the same or different terms of court, regular or special) and may preside alone over such session. The said two judges shall have the same powers in all matters coming before the court; and in case two sessions of the court are held at the same time, the judgments, orders, verdicts, and all proceedings of a session of the court, held by either of the judges, shall be as effective as if one session only were being held at a time.

Regular terms of said court shall be held at Honolulu on the second Monday in April and October, and special terms may be held at such times and places in said district as the said judges may deem expedient.

Original legislation behind 48 U.S.C. § 641 was April 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 86, 31 Stat. 158, it was not amended by the judiciary act of March 3, 1911. It is of note that Congress used the term "district court" in both the act of April 30, 1900 and the act of March 3, 1911, even though the 1911 act, and 28 U.S.C. § 1, 1940 ed., pertained to district courts in the several States party to the Constitution, where the 1900 act and 48 U.S.C. § 641, 1940 ed., pertained to a territorial court. Both were established prior to Supreme Court definitions in 1922 & 1938, so without further evidence, we must rely on the Supreme Court definitions. Fortunately, we have other evidence, but the fact that the current 28 U.S.C. § 132 is an amalgamation of sections from the 1940 edition pertaining to Article III courts of the United States and a territorial court demonstrates that the current 28 U.S.C. § 132 is not reliable evidence of anything -- it cannot be taken at face value, and it cannot be given legislative construction, as Congress clearly told us in enacting legislation. When two or more sections of original acts are amalgamated in a single section of the Code, and the Code (1) does not enact new law, (2) does not repeal old law, and (3) does not amend existing law, the Code section obviously has no lawful effect. By reviewing sections of the 1940 edition of the Code reproduced above, it's obvious that ordinary people of ordinary intelligence would be incapable of determining what portions of the current 28 U.S.C. § 132 are derived from which section of the 1940 edition.

Fortunately, the Code reveals the truth if you spend enough time poking around in it. In order to distinguish between Article III district courts of the United States, and territorial courts, which are defined as United States District Courts, we will begin with two definitions at 28 U.S.C. § 451 in the current edition:

§ 451. Definitions

As used in this title:

The term "court of the United States' includes the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office during good behavior.

The terms "district court" and "district court of the United States" mean the courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title.

In the world of bureaucrats, measures and definitions will be given in the least intelligible terms. For example, a good bureaucrat might struggle to determine average speed for a trip from Oklahoma City to Los Angeles. Rather than simply dividing total miles by the number of hours traveled to determine average miles per hour, he might calculate the answer to determine furlongs per fortnight. If would be far easier to define the terms "district court" and "district court of the United States" as the Article III courts of the United States. But that would be too simple. Instead, the definition above retains verbiage from 28 U.S.C. § 1 & § 1 of the judiciary act of March 3, 1911. Article III district courts of the United States were established in chapter five of the act. That chapter, as amended, is reproduced in sections 81 through 131 of the current edition of Title 28.

The trail goes from § 451 to § 610, the definition of courts under administration of the Administrative Office of United States Courts (28 U.S.C. §§ 601-612):

§ 610. Courts defined

As used in this chapter the word "courts" includes the courts of appeals and district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of International Trade.

Here we have the terms "district court of the United States" and "United States District Court" used in the same section, so the A ~ B principle applies: The Article III district court of the United States ~ the territorial United States District Court.

The section above is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 450, 1940 ed.:

§ 450. (Judicial Code, section 308.) Courts affected; definitions.

The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the several United States circuit courts of appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the several district court of the United States in the continental United States, the Court of Claims, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the United States Customs Court, the District Court for the District of Alaska, the District Court for the District of Hawaii, the District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the United States Court for China. The term "courts" as used in this chapter means the courts specified in this section. The term "continental United States" as used in this chapter means the States of the Union and the District of Columbia. For the purposes of this chapter, the District of Columbia shall be deemed to be a judicial circuit. The chief justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia shall have the duties, powers, and authority of the senior circuit judge for such circuit, and the associate justices of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia shall have the duties, powers, and authority of circuit judges for such circuit. (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 308, as added Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 1, 53 Stat. 1223.)

The Administrative Office of United States District Courts was created by act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223, with duties of the office specified in sections 444-450 of the 1940 edition of Title 28. Section 450 of the 1940 edition demonstrates that Congress was anything but consistent when naming the various courts created through the years, but the "district court of the United States" situated in the several States has remained a constant. This matter is nailed down as follows: "The provisions of this chapter shall apply to ... the several district courts of the United States in the continental United States ... The term 'continental United States' as used in this chapter means the States of the Union and the District of Columbia." The "United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone," is specifically named, and the District Courts of the Districts of Alaska and Hawaii, both of which were still territories of the United States, are named. The Article III district courts of the United States were clearly set apart from territorial courts, as is the case for the current 28 U.S.C. § 610. Alaska and Hawaii, which became States of the Union in 1959, have been eliminated from the current 28 U.S.C. § 610 as territorial courts were supposed to be replaced by Article III district courts of the United States when Alaska and Hawaii were respectively admitted to the Union.

We will now consider the section in the current edition of Title 28 that evidences authority for appointing court reporters:

§ 753. Reporters

(a) Each district court of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall appoint one or more court reporters.

When we consult the definition of courts in Chapter 57, General Provisions Applicable to Court Officers and Employees, we find that we are referred back to the definition of courts at 28 U.S.C. § 610:

§ 963. Courts defined

As used in this chapter, unless the context indicates otherwise, the words "court" and "courts" include the Supreme Court of the United States and the courts enumerated in section 610 of this title.

We'll now see what courts are authorized to convene grand and petit juries via the current 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 & 1869(f):

§ 1861. Declaration of policy

It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes. It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States, and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose.

§ 1869. Definitions

For purposes of this chapter --

(f) "district court of the United States", "district court", and "court" shall mean any district court established by chapter 5 of this title, and any court which is created by Act of Congress in a territory and is invested with any jurisdiction of a district court established by chapter 5 of this title;

Now we will consult the definition of court of the United States used by the General Accounting Office, which is general agent of the Treasury of the United States. This definition is at 4 CFR § 91.2:

§ 91.2 Definitions

(a) Agency means --

(6) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, and any of the courts set forth in section 610 of title 28, U.S. Code. Section 610 defines "courts" to include the courts of appeals and district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States Claims Court and the Court of International Trade.

Our evidence is compelling: 28 U.S.C. § 132 is a decoy and fraud which amalgamates two sections from the 1940 edition of the United States Code, with the basis of the section being obsolete due to Hawaii having been admitted to the Union of several States party to the Constitution in 1959. The only legitimate United States District Court, as defined in Balzac vs. Porto Rico, is a territorial court created by Act of Congress, and the first-level Article III court of the United States, as defined in Mookini vs. United States, is the district court of the United States situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution, and theoretically, whatever court is presently located in the District of Columbia. The United States District Court situated in the several States has usurped authority of the Article III district court of the United States -- it is not defined as a court of the United States, it does not have statutory authority for appointment of clerks, reporters, etc., and does not have statutory authority to convene grand and petit juries. It is, in effect, a private court, as contrary to Article I, Sec. 8, clauses 9 & 18 and Article III, Sec. 1, it was not created by Congress in accordance with legislative requirements set forth in Article I, Sec. 7 of the Constitution -- it defies geographical limitation evidenced by 4 U.S.C. § 72.

Original jurisdiction of the United States in criminal proceedings is evidenced at the current 18 U.S.C. § 3231:

§ 3231. District courts

The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.

Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof.

Our evidence, when we go from title to title of the current Code, previous editions of the Code, the Statutes at Large, administrative regulations, and Supreme Court definitions, is consistent. No section of the Code is or can be law of the United States; sections of the Code are at best prima facie the law or legal evidence of law; no legislative construction can be derived from location of any section of the Code; and, as we will further demonstrate, the Code is representative of municipal law in territory subject to sovereignty of the United States.

We will resume demonstration that the "Code of Laws of the United States of America" is municipal law under the territorial clause by going to authority for the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure at the current 28 U.S.C. 2072:

§ 2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe

(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.

(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.

(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.

(Added Pub.L. 100-702, Title IV, § 401(a), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4648, and amended Pub. L. 101-650, Title III, § 315, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5115.)

The above section was originally enacted by the act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 961, and was amended several times through 1966 prior to provisions cited following the section. The 1948 legislation, which authorizes the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for "United States district courts" (territorial) replaced previous legislation which authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for Article III district courts of the United States. Applicable sections of 1937 & 1948 orders are reproduced here to demonstrate the shift: Order of December 20, 1937

It is ordered that Rules of Procedure for the District Courts of the United States be adopted pursuant to Section 2 of the Act of June 19, 1934...

Order of December 29, 1948

1. That the title "Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States" be amended to read "Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts".

It's worth noting that the Supreme Court more or less fired a shot across Congress' bow in the 1938 Mookini vs. United States decision: Mookini challenged appeal authority based on rules promulgated in 1937 being applicable only in Article III district courts of the United States, which were then specified in the rules, where the Hawaiian court was a territorial court, defined in Balzac vs. Porto Rico as a United States District Court. In other words, the unwritten message to Congress was, "Listen, if you're going to impose this fraud, at least get your terminology straight."

It was straightened out in the 1948 predecessor to the current 28 U.S.C. 2072. In compliance with the legislative correction, the Supreme Court changed application of the rules from Article III district courts of the United States to territorial United States district courts.

This is another case of, "Are you going to believe me or your lying eyes?"

I can read what the Supreme Court and Congress have respectively written, as I suspect most other literate Americans can. So what have they said? Congress said, "Justices of the Supreme Court, you can write rules of procedure for territorial United States District Courts." Justices of the Supreme Court accepted the statutory order, and in the judicial order of December 29, 1948, told everybody, "The Federal rules of civil procedure no longer apply in Article III District Courts of the United States, they apply in territorial United States District Courts."

The order pertaining to the criminal code was effected on December 27, 1948:

Order of December 27, 1948

1. That the title of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be, and it hereby is, amended to read as follows:

Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts.

We don't want to put words in anyone's mouth, so will consider Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (F.R.Crim.P.):

Rule 1. Scope

These rules govern the procedure in all criminal proceedings in the courts of the United States, as provided in Rule 54(a); and, whenever specifically provided in one of the rules, to preliminary, supplementary, and special proceedings before United States magistrate judges and at proceedings before state and local judicial officers.

We must go to F.R.Crim.P., Rule 54 to find what we're hunting for:

Rule 54. Application and Exception

(a) Courts. These rules apply to all criminal proceedings in the United States District Courts; in the District of Guam; in the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, except as otherwise provided in articles IV and V of the covenant provided by the Act of March 24, 1976 (90 Stat. 263); in the District Court of the Virgin Islands; and (except as otherwise provided in the Canal Zone) in the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone; in the United States Courts of Appeals; and in the Supreme Court of the United States; except that the prosecution of offenses in the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall be by indictment or information as otherwise provided by law.

Application prescribed at F.R.Crim.P., Rule 54(a) complies with the Order of Dec. 27, 1948 -- the Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable in territorial United States District Courts, with four named in Rule 54(a). Because the United States jurisdiction in the Canal Zone was extinguished when we gave up the lease on the Canal, the rules now apply only to the three courts defined as courts of the United States at 18 U.S.C. § 23, which is September 1994 legislation:

§ 23. Court of the United States defined

As used in this title, except where otherwise expressly provided the term "court of the United States" includes the District Court of Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands. (Added Pub. L. 103-322, Title XXXII, § 320914(a), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2128)

The above definition is exclusive of Article III district courts of the United States. Consequently, statutory authority evidenced by 18 U.S.C. § 23 determines courts in which the Federal Rules of Procedure are applicable, as they are applicable solely in territorial United States District Courts, per 28 U.S.C. § 2072, applicable orders of December 1948, orders since, and the rules themselves. Rule 54(a) of the F.R.Crim.P., Rule 81 of the F.R.Civ.P., and Rule 1101 of the Federal Rules of Evidence all limit application to territorial courts of the United States, which collectively are defined as United States District Courts. We will demonstrate further limitation with the rules, but first need to review 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) as this pivotal subsection conclusively locks things down:

(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.

What section in the Constitution vests legislative authority in the judicial branch of United States Government? The repeal power conferred by § 2072(b) obviously stands in contradiction to the Separation of Powers Doctrine, which precludes one branch of government exercising powers vested in another by the Constitution. Justices Black and Douglas took this position for years, but the majority of the Supreme Court and Congress elected to ignore their criticism. Consequently, we must conclude that the United States Code, by being subjected to judicial repeal, with rules of procedure and evidence effectively constituting governing judicial-generated law, was not promulgated under Congress' Article I enumerated powers. This conclusion is confirmed when we consider applications at Rule 54(c), F.R.Crim.P.:

"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.

"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.

Federal rules of evidence and procedure are admiralty and maritime in nature, they proceed "in the course of the civil law," so they cannot apply in the several States party to the Constitution. Via judiciary acts of 1789 & 1792, Congress established Article III district courts of the United States as common law courts, or more precisely, as courts of common law that proceed in the course of the common law, as it evolved in England to that point in history. This was mandated by Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment, which secure due process in the course of the common law for the sovereign American people. (Wayman vs. Southard (1825) 23 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed. 253; former Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the opinion.)

Now we will consider the section which evidences statutory authority for imprisonment at 18 U.S.C. § 4001:

§ 4001. Limitation on detention; control of prisons

(a) No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.

"Act of Congress" is a term of art which has the meaning prescribed by the Supreme Court in Rule 54(c), F.R.Crim.P. An Act of Congress is municipal law in the compact of insular possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia known as the United States of America, which is defined as an agency of the United States. The Supreme Court specified that an Act of Congress is applicable in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, and in a territory or in an insular possession of the United States. For purposes of the title, "State" includes only territory subject to sovereignty of the United States by way of the territorial clause at Article IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution. We find at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) that the United States may imprison people only under Acts of Congress applicable in territory subject to the United States. Because Congress has vested repeal power in the Supreme Court via 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), the definition of "Act of Congress" at Rule 54(a), F.R.Crim.P., governs application of the term at 18 U.S.C § 4001(a). If "Act of Congress" used in 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) means anything other than that which is prescribed in Rule 54(c), the section is repealed. It's an either-or proposition, there is no third alternative.

The scheme the Code of Laws of the United States of America and Federal encroachment are perpetrated under is called Cooperative Federalism. The Supreme Court appears to have coined the term in about 1966. Prior to that, it was known simply as Federalism, and is commonly referred to simply as Federalism today. Prior to that, it was known as Corporatism. It is accommodated by governments of the several States and their respective political subdivisions, including county and municipal governments, school boards, etc., through the municipal corporation structure which presumes that each is an instrumentality of the United States on a part with the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other insular possessions. By the early 1920's, Congress had moved virtually all Federal government under the Article IV, Sec. 3 territorial clause, abandoning Article I delegated powers. The Code of Laws of the United States of America came along at about the time the process was complete.

Why was this shift made? Think about it: The Federal Reserve Act was promulgated in December 1913. Once usurpation of power over national credit and monetary systems was effected, thereby taking complete command of the national economy, the die was cast. The tail had to follow the dog. But those responsible have been extremely careful to document the paper trail. The Constitution of the United States is alive and well; those who perpetrate the fraud that compromises the sovereign People of this nation do so at considerable risk.

Where is the stronghold? This is the second flaw in the case Larry cited -- the decision issued from a United States District Court located in one of the several States. This fraud was institutionalized in 1948: District Courts of the United States, not United States District Courts, are Article III courts of the United States. United States District Courts located in the several States are private courts disguised under the name of territorial courts. Only three legitimate territorial courts remain, as previously demonstrated via Rule 54(a), F.R.Crim.P. and 18 U.S.C. § 23.

By beginning with three essential questions, we stepped back far enough to get a constitutional perspective. This is among the disadvantages for many sincere attorneys and government employees. Because of deficient education and continuing exposure to environments where underlying Cooperative Federalism frauds serve as basic assumptions, it is extremely difficult for them to mentally, psychologically, and emotionally clean the slate to begin with basic building blocks, including the original and essential source of authority.

We began with the basic question of whether or not the United States Code is law. Probably we should conclude with the next obvious question: Who in the several States cares if it is or not?

Hopefully Larry will tackle my rationale. He is extremely competent, so I encourage him to put me to the acid test. In the meantime, I strongly recommend that others access Larry's web site as he has gone to great lengths to provide helpful and informative material.

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